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Abstract  
 
 
This case study traces the life history through several transformations of software used by knowledge 
workers in a global professional practice. The target application provides a globally operating  major 
firm with knowledge management support for legal practitioners and provides data to support 
managing its relationships with clients. The research constitutes a careful longitudinal reflection using 
the processes and techniques of Action Research and Grounded Theory. An information systems 
change management process is promulgated.  
 
The change process that was emerged is richer than existing change management processes with which 
it is compared. It is suggested that this enhanced change process may be useful particularly in 
organisations of knowledge rich practitioners.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Recently, a new feature, was added to the system of interest in this research, which we 
are calling Rebrand, as part of a standard software release.  The change simply added 
a checkbox under the application’s main search bar, accompanied by the text 
‘Remove copies from search results’.  This change, known as the “clone filter”, would 
appear innocuous, yet its addition was the result of a complex interplay of 
organisational, economic, and technological factors that have unfolded over the life of 
both the system in which it is now inscribed and the organisation which produced it.  
This change was widely perceived by those involved in the development of Rebrand 
to be the latest in a line of changes that have delivered incremental improvements 
while larger and more fundamental problems with the system remain unaddressed.  
This case study, methodologically rooted in elements of Grounded Theory (Glaser, 
1967) and Action Research (Mathiasson et al, 2012) advances a model of information 
systems change.  The emerged model suggests that change can be understood as the 
outcome of a decision-making process involving the operation of mediating processes 
on the shared interpretive contexts of multiple participants. 
 
1.1 The Research Object 
The research focussed on the case of Rebrand. The project has evolved from the 
legacy Operational System, to the ERP-Outlier Database, to Rebrand I, Rebrand II, 
and is currently undergoing a proposed transition to Rebrand III.  Despite its long 
history of development and a general consensus that successful realisation of the aims 
of the project would provide great value to the firm, overall adoption of the tool 
remains weak.  
The vision for the Rebrand project has become to build a strategic tool that will 
capture all deal and credentials information, with the support of lawyers and staff in 
the Knowhow & Learning and Marketing functions.  Achievement of this vision will 
require full adoption of the tool by the firm globally.  The perceived value of the 
system is that it will 1) differentiate the firm from its competitors 2) assist lawyers and 
marketing staff in pitching for work, 3) help staff identify other staff who possess 
expertise, and 4) act as an archive of relevant historical documentation.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The study investigates a complex project undertaken by a major law firm which we 
are calling “Global Law”, using a qualitative, mixed-method approach. Grounded 
Theory was paired with Action Research as the lead researcher was actively involved 
in the enactment of the system changes. Neither of the methodologies selected for this 
research purport to be value-free, and action research in particular, explicitly involves 
“a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in 
…, grounded in a participatory worldview.” (Coghlan 2009) 
The researcher’s involvement with the Rebrand project began in 2006, after joining 
the firm as an Information Advisor in the Tokyo office.  At that time, he was trained 
on the legacy Operational System with the understanding that the ERP-Outlier 
database, which would later be re-branded as Rebrand, would be released in the near 
future.  The expectation was that this release would significantly change the work 
processes of Information advisors, who assist lawyers with research and managing 
business and legal information.  This release, however, was significantly delayed.  In 
2010 the practitioner/researcher assisted with a limited roll-out of the Rebrand project 
in Asia, offering training sessions to legal staff in Global Law’s, East Asian offices.  
This was followed by a lengthy suspension of his relation to Rebrand, as he relocated 
to the London office on other duties.  However, in early 2014 his responsibilities 
changed once again, and responsibility for the future development of Rebrand came 
under his remit. 
 
Research interviews were conducted face-to-face in private meeting rooms or via 
direct telephone calls, and each was recorded and fully transcribed.   The university’s 
ethical procedure for research was enacted and table 1 summarises data collection. 
ID Office Group Rank Proximity Length Duration Words 
I.01 London ISS 1 2 1 00:56:16 10,475 
I.02 London Practice 0 0 1 00:54:06 9767 
I.03 London Strategy 1 2 0 00:15:12 2663 
I.04 London ISS 2 1 1 01:15:40 12,299 
I.05 London K&L 2 0 0 00:57:19 9582 
I.06 London Marketing 4 0 0 00:22:51 3480 
I.07 London ISS 2 0 0 01:09:34 12,771 
I.08 London K&L 4 0 0 00:59:30 11,106 
I.09 Frankfurt K&L 5 1 2 00:29:22 5289 
I.10 London Practice 1 2 3 00:15:56 3205 
I.11 London K&L 3 0 1 00:54:03 8072 
I.12 London K&L 6 1 0 00:53:56 10,221 
I.13 Hong Kong K&L 5 2 1 00:56:35 10,720 
I.14 London Practice 0 0 0 00:58:01 10,642 
I.15 Colchester ISS 4 0 1 00:45:36 6582 
I.16 Bangkok Marketing 4 0 1 01:09:22 10,793 
I.17 London Marketing 2 1 0 00:52:56 10,519 
I.18 London Management 1 2 1 00:36:09 5788 
I.19 London Marketing 2 1 1 00:53:38 10,214 
Table 1 . Summary of Data Collection 
 
2.0 Structure of the Organisation 
The law firm is headed by a Partnership with representative committees providing 
ownership and direction for the business.  These committees oversee an organisation 
divided into the fee-earning Practice on one side and the supporting Business Services 
functions on the other.  There is a number of broad Divisions (Finance and Projects, 
Corporate, and Commercial) which are broken down into Practice Groups focussing 
on specific areas of law.  It is also possible to distinguish between Transactional and 
Advisory Practices, with the former running deals that are structured as projects, 
while the latter tend to open matters of indefinite duration, providing legal advice to 
clients on an ad hoc basis.   
Business Services are similarly specialised, and include most of the Functions that 
would be expected in an organisation of this size, pertinently, involved with Rebrand, 
Information Systems and Services (ISS), Knowledge and Learning (K&L) and 
Marketing.  Each of the three core Rebrand-related Business Services functions is 
further subdivided into sub-units, each with its own goals and interests.   
 
Whilst lines between the various groups and functions might appear impermeable on 
an organisational chart, there are many instances of cross-practice, cross-functional, 
and practice/function collaboration. Four examples that were of particular importance 
were the Project Approval Board, the Rebrand Steering Committee, the Rebrand 
BAU (business as usual) Support Group, and the Rebrand Network, each of which 
contains a diverse membership drawn from different areas of the organisation. 
 
3.0 History of the System 
According to one informant, Rebrand ultimately has its roots in a system we will call 
Embryonic System, which was developed around the year 2000 by the Capital Markets 
practice with help from ISS, and supported by a Partner described by one informant as 
‘a visionary’.  This system was conceptualised to create a searchable repository of 
surrogate records, each of which corresponded to and recorded key features of Capital 
Markets deals, as described in offering circulars and deal binders. Routinely, this was 
stored in libraries housed within local information units.  The target audience of 
Capital Markets fee earners was well-defined, though the system was not designed 
around an expectation of fee earner self-service.  Information Advisors (IAs), 
belonging to the K&L function with Practice-based associations and training, were the 
primary gatekeepers between the fee earners and the physical library, running 
searches and directing fee-earners to the appropriate materials.  The expectation that 
information professionals would be core users of the system at that time heightened 
the importance of controlled vocabularies for capturing deal information, while 
reducing the requirement for a simplified interface accessible to untrained users.  
Embryonic System was replaced by Operational System, which preserved the key 
features but added functionality for the maintenance of controlled vocabularies. The 
second generation of the Operational System aimed at making broader and more 
significant organisational changes, opening access to the system to other practice 
groups and their corresponding Information Units.  This necessitated the construction 
of elaborate, specialised controlled vocabularies for each practice.  These vocabularies 
were the products of cooperation between Practice-based Professional Support 
Lawyers (PSLs) and Information Advisors.  Adoption of the system was strongest 
amongst the largest transactional practices, such as Mainstream Corporate, Banking, 
and Projects.  At this time access to the system was largely restricted to expert users in 
K&L, and the Operational System was never deployed on the desktops of normal 
users throughout the firm. 
The ERP-Outlier project was an attempt to build a successor to the Operational 
System that would deliver a number of substantial improvements, including a new 
interface that would enable self-service for non-specialist fee earners and business 
services staff. There was an accompanying expansion of the scope of the system to 
include credential information that would be of use to the Marketing department in 
preparing pitch materials to be used by the firm for the purpose of winning new work.  
Accordingly, support from upper management in the Marketing function was strong at 
this time.  However, development of the ERP-Outlier system was plagued by 
setbacks, prompting one informant who was active in several technical projects at the 
time to describe the system as a ‘source of pain’ for the firm.  Interview data suggests 
a number of contributing factors including: weak internal requirements gathering 
processes; the decision to build ERP-Outlier as a new interface on top of the existing 
Operational System technical platform; retention of the Operational System 
knowledge model without active re-validation or re-design in light of the addition of 
Marketing data; an interface design based on the needs of the power users comprising 
the core audience of the incumbent system; the conscious exclusion of Operational 
System project team members, perceived as resistant to change, from the new project; 
ISS experiments with off-shore development that resulted in a poorly architected and 
poorly understood codebase; and integration with the firm’s Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system.   
The project was formally halted by the firm’s CIO after it was perceived that an 
external team had seriously misrepresented the state of progress of development of the 
software they had been tasked with.  Marketing withdrew funding and support for the 
ERP-Outlier project. More generally, the reputational damage suffered by the 
initiative was found to be unrepairable, leading to a complete re-branding of the 
system as Rebrand, and the formation of a new supporting team. Rebrand never again 
enjoyed a level of institutional support comparable to the ERP-Outlier project.  Now, 
changes, based on documentation drawn up by the new team, were forced into a 
number of phased mini-projects delivered through the firm’s BAU processes.   
Phase one focussed on upload of marketing data into the system, attempting to collate 
the ERP-Outlier data captured by Marketing staff around the world.  
 
Phase two had two chief aims: global, firm-wide adoption, and integration with 
Business Objects.  As in the past, Business Services staff members are the primary 
users of the system, though Marketing use has grown considerably and now slightly 
exceeds use within K&L.  This effort ultimately proved unsuccessful, owing to 
technical issues with the Rebrand platform. With the prospect of Business Objects use 
ruled out, the chief aim of Rebrand III was a ‘lift and shift’ of the system’s data store 
from the Operational System to the ERP, achieving more direct integration.  However, 
this phase was never initiated. At the time of writing, the Innovation Centre concept 
has been replaced by a technical demonstration being run within the ISS Architecture 
team, with cooperation from K&L and other functions, and the future of Rebrand as a 
distinct application remains uncertain. 
 
4.0 Research Results 
Because development of the Rebrand system has been on-going for many years and 
has involved many participants from different groups within the organisation, the case 
presented an abundance of potential themes.  Similarly, the openness of the 
methodology employed meant that a large number of perspectives emerged.  
Choosing a central topic from among the many processes that emerged therefore 
required taking a step back from the low-level codes that had been assigned to 
discrete data points, and considering the overall high-level perspectives expressed by 
informants.   
The selection of the primary phenomenon on which to focus was motivated by two 
statements made by senior stakeholders in the course of the interviews, which neatly 
encapsulated the themes that pervaded discussions with many of the informants.  The 
first came out of a discussion about how Rebrand compares with similar projects 
within the organisation: 
“…You know, I do all sorts of steering committees and things – [Rebrand] is the most 
depressing.  Just because it's frustrating to be dealing with something that…everyone 
knows that there are problems with it.  And they may have different views as to what 
the particular problems are but fundamentally everyone knows there are problems 
with it…” 
The second provides a perspective on the overall historical development of the 
system: 
“I guess my perspective is obviously influenced by where we are now, which is 
actually I think…we've let it evolve in a way that is unsatisfactory.  And we've been 
told that, that's kind of an inevitable consequence of the way [Rebrand] was 
originally established.” 
These themes – widespread consensus that an existing technical system is problematic 
combined with an organisational inability to commit to resolution of the root 
problems, resulting in an unsatisfactory evolution of the system and frustration among 
stakeholders – appear in the interview data again and again.  This research, therefore, 
sets out to explain this dynamic by offering a substantive theory of the change process 
leading to superficial change, and the potential constraining effects thereof. 
The model shown as figure 1, represents an abstraction of the process that emerged 
out of the details described by informants in the course of data collection. The next 
stage of this research will be to seek validation of this model with models of 
Organisational Change Management as found by Todman (2005).  In the sections that 
follow each element in this high level model of change will be explored in further 
detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Change Process Model 
 
4.1 Existing System 
Because the present model is concerned with the decision-making process in regard to 
existing systems, it assumes the presence of such a system as a given.  The technical 
and social systems co-exist in a complex, reciprocal relationship.   
4.2 The Rebrand System 
As outlined in the section on its history, the existing system comprising Rebrand is a 
result of the historical development which shaped its antecedents.  Its underlying 
technical platform is composed of an SQL database (which still uses the legacy 
Operational System interface to fulfil many administrative and taxonomical 
functions), a search engine, a bespoke web interface, and a reporting interface.  Other 
tools, are technically distinct but have functionality so intimately connected with 
Rebrand that they should be considered as part of the same overall technical platform.  
This technical system is used in diverse ways, and numerous supporting processes are 
performed in relation to both system inputs and outputs by participants within the 
business. These processes are in turn carried out by staff belonging to various 
organisational groups.  Overall responsibility for the future development of the system 
is effectively held by the Knowledge Systems Manager within K&L, but is managed 
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with the support of several cross-functional teams.  However, decision-making power 
as it relates to fundamental changes is held by approval bodies in upper management 
within ISS and in the Strategic Project teams, which consider proposals for change 
that are prepared by ISS.  Given the complexity of the technical platform, the 
supporting processes, and the resulting organisational structure, most proposals for 
change should not be considered in terms of any of these dimensions in isolation.  
4.3 Catalyst for Change 
The proposal for change is the result of organizational tension brought about by 
misalignment between the system and the requirements of organisational units, which 
themselves shift in relation to changes in the internal and external environments.  The 
change process can be initiated as the result of established, formal review processes or 
of unanticipated demand, depending on the management style of the organisation.  
Responses to proposals for change to an system can take one of four forms: a) 
maintenance of the as-is system, b) improvement of the system within existing design 
constraints, c) improvement of the system by changing existing design constraints, 
and d) decommissioning of the system. 
4.3.1 A Catalyst for Change to Rebrand 
Due to the historical circumstances of its development – in particular, its early roots in 
a single Practice group, its expansion to other groups without revalidation of 
requirements, and the high-profile failure of the ERP-Outlier project – Rebrand has 
been a locus of organisational tension since it first went live; requests for change have 
been less about enhancing existing or adding new functionality and more about 
resolving core design issues and fundamental misalignments of the system with its 
user base. 
One informant comments: 
“…I discuss this system with people and try to explain it to them, how it came about, 
and the fact that it started off as Operational Systems, and then somebody tried 
to…make Rebrand fit around the Operational Systems, rather than trying to just use 
the raw data and input it into a new system.  Anytime you start that way, you're 
starting off at a disadvantage.” 
The ‘clone filter’, is an example of a response to one such issue.  The problem stems 
from three facts: 1) a single matter can correspond to multiple ‘deals’, 2) a single 
matter can be represented by multiple deal records within the system, and 3) all deal 
records are stored within a Practice-specific sub-Index in the database (i.e., a record 
‘belongs to’ the Corporate Transactions sub-Index or the Capital Markets 
Transactions sub-Index). 
There is no simple explanation for this design choice, since it is largely lost to 
organisational memory, but interview data suggested at least two partial explanations: 
1) the decision was made to implement a system that was not in third normal form due 
to performance inherent in available technology at the time it was first implemented, 
and 2) the sub-Indexes offered a way of determining the scope of deals, allowing 
content owners (PSLs and Information Advisors) full control over the taxonomies that 
would be applicable to deal records in their ‘buckets’. 
While this allowed the creation of a Practice-specific ‘perspective’ on a matter as 
represented by a practice record, it also led to fragmentation.   Due to the complex 
nature of the work carried out by the firm, many matters involve multiple Practices, 
and each of these perspectives are encoded in separate deal records, creating the 
possibility that important information could be missed unless one checks all records 
pertaining to a given matter.   
These design choices were further complicated by the fact that Rebrand is not 
integrated with the firm’s financial and matter opening systems, meaning that records 
of matters only appear in the system when they are manually added.  This not only led 
to data coverage problems, but also necessitated the creation of complex processes 
that involve several participants. Further, the Marketing function asserted that they 
would need full coverage of deals in order to support their pitching processes, and 
because wider adoption of the system by Marketing was considered desirable a 
process was put in place whereby Deal Announcements published by one Practice 
would be ‘cloned’ into the sub-Indexes of any other Practices involved in the given 
matter.  The result was the on-going creation of large numbers of virtually identical 
records, which then served to undermine the perceived quality of search results in the 
eyes of fee earners.  
This conflict between the needs of the K&L, Marketing, and Fee Earner groups 
therefore created the need for a change to the technical system, though the root 
problem is deeply embedded in the system. 
 
 
 5.0 Interpretation – Influencing 
The organisation’s decision-making process is characterised by the interaction of 
interpretive contexts with mediating processes.  The interpretive contexts frame 
individuals’ understanding of the benefits and costs associated with the proposed 
change in relation to them.  The mediating processes define the way in which 
individuals’ interpretations of the costs and benefits of proposed changes are shared. 
Both the epistemic and economic mediating processes are subject to the operations of 
power within the organisation; power determines which interpretive contexts are 
privileged in the decision-making process. This stage of the change process is 
described as ‘Interpretation – Influencing’ because interview data suggests that, just 
as the technical system cannot be completely understood in separation from the larger 
organisation, the processes of interpreting the meaning of proposed changes to the 
system and influencing those changes are never fully distinct.  This comment from a 
senior K&L manager involved in the project demonstrates how interlinked the 
contexts and processes, described in fuller detail below, can be: 
"We had a wish list of 300 items for Rebrand II.  We bid for the money and bid for the 
time to be able to do it.  It was approved.  But then, of course, at the end of 2009, the 
market crashed...so we were told we could have a third of the money...and we had a 
week to redo our business case to cover the requirements that we thought we could 
live without.  So we tried doing a MoSCoW, as you do in any project.  The Musts still 
left us with a list of 200.  So we sat down - me, my counterpart from Marketing, and 
someone from ISS - the three of us sat down and negotiated what we felt were the 
most important things." 
 
5.1 Interpretive Contexts 
The meaning of the proposed changes is interpreted by participants through a variety 
of contextual lenses, in terms of their anticipated costs and potential benefits at the 
technical, psychological, and structural, and procedural levels.  Each of these is a 
perspective on the system as a whole.  These theoretical constructs were drawn from 
the interview data during axial coding, by overlaying the hierarchy of concepts that 
emerged with a higher-level scheme of classification. 
The Technical Context refers to participants’ understanding of the functionality, 
goals, limitations, and potential of the system conceived as a technical platform.  It 
frames questions such as “What will the proposed change mean for the system?” and 
“How can the changes be implemented?”  Codes were associated with Technical 
contexts where they referred to distinct software or hardware tools and applications, 
or where they related to aspects of those technical artifacts. 
The Psychological Context refers to the motivations of participants in the process, 
based on their understanding of the role they play as individuals in the process.  It 
frames questions such as “What will this change mean for me?”  Strong motivation 
will lead individuals to become more engaged in the process. Weak motivation will 
lead individuals to avoid the process. Codes were associated with Psychological 
contexts where they related to individual, subjective assessments of value.  
The Structural Context refers to participants’ understanding of the formal structure 
(size and shape) of the organisation, the place of participants within that structure, the 
malleability of the structure, and the potential effects that the proposed changes will 
have on that structure.  It frames questions such as “What will this change mean for 
the size, structure, and responsibilities of the groups of which I am a member?”  
Codes were associated with the Structural Context where they referred to formal and 
informal groups or roles within the system. 
The Process-oriented context refers to participants’ understanding of the nature and 
scope of the supporting processes carried out by themselves and others within the 
system, as well as the potential effects that the proposed changes will have on those 
processes.  It frames questions such as “What will this change mean for the processes 
in which I am engaged?”  Codes were associated with processes carried out by 
participants, including operations performed on the inputs and outputs of the technical 
system.    
 
5.2 Interpretive Contexts for Changes to Rebrand 
5.2.1 Technical Contexts 
There is a heavily embedded perception among informants that further development 
of Rebrand is heavily constrained by existing issues in the technical platform.  
Changing the basic design at this point is a considered by ISS informants to be a 
major hurdle, which would require rebuilding the system from first principles.  
However, incremental change also has its share of obstacles; even the estimation and 
implementation of incremental improvements are further complicated by the quality 
of the legacy code base.  One informant comments 
“…when you're fighting the system, when you're fighting the code you're maintaining, 
you're always going to hit ‘Oh, it's going to take two months now to do…just a small 
change.’… It shouldn't be like that.” 
Note that even this assessment of the technical prospects for change is coloured by the 
psychological context, highlighting the multi-faceted nature of the interpretive 
process.  
5.2.2 Psychological Contexts 
Interview data indicate that participants involved in Rebrand development or support 
over the years have made active decisions to engage with or avoid the system. The 
respondents cited various motivating factors. Interview data suggest that this context 
is less affected by the specifics of a given change request but more concerned with the 
long-term effects of prolonged development and perceived failures. The comments of 
one informant show how the context of his own psychological interpretations of 
involvement with the project has changed over time: 
“As I am today, I would probably have been high sceptical about what was being 
planned.  But maybe that's not just the power years after being here five years now, 
but perhaps specific to having hindsight on [Rebrand] itself and seeing where it is…a 
combination of “it's my job”, youthful enthusiasm, and youthful naiveté… is why I 
stuck by it.  I definitely believed in the fact that, you know, it wasn't going anywhere, 
and five years later it has not gone anywhere.” 
5.2.3 Structural Contexts 
A system of Rebrand’s size and complexity necessarily involves several participants.  
This leads to different interpretations of the scope of the unit’s responsibilities in 
relation to the system.  The involvement of the Marketing department is particularly 
interesting, given that the ERP-Outlier project, which laid the groundwork for 
Rebrand in its present form, was strongly supported by Marketing prior to the 
project’s eventual failure.  Furthermore, integration of Marketing data with the 
existing K&L database was one of the most significant features to emerge out of the 
project.  Finally, efforts to persuade the Marketing functions fully to adopt the system 
and transfer their deal-related data continue to this day. 
This complex history of joint ownership and development between K&L and 
Marketing has been the source of continuous tension that has motivated changes to the 
system, particularly around data entry practices.  This appears to be related to the 
perception that the definition of data entry standards is ‘owned’ by K&L.  In fact, the 
situation has led the setting up of another set of standards defining how Rebrand data 
should be used after exporting from the system, rather than changing standards at the 
input stage, owing to the complexity and inflexibility of the standards ‘owned’ by 
K&L.  One Marketing-based informant illustrates the nature of the conflict: 
“…what happened for me was I got edit rights onto [Rebrand] …I was correcting our 
[ERP-Outlier] and marking things up, and I kept getting these e-mails from somebody 
at I&I saying you're doing it wrong…and, I remember, I'm like “well how come 
someone…who's not Marketing is telling me - someone in Marketing - how I should 
write a credential?”…then they're like “well the manual was written this way”...I'm 
like “well if we're using it from Marketing why am I doing this?”…it wasn't even a 
Catch-22, it was just a little bit of idiocy as far as I was concerned; it just made no 
sense. “ 
5.2.4 Process-oriented Contexts 
A technical change to the system that enabled integration with the financial system or 
decoupling of data entry for K&L and Marketing data would change the nature of 
ownership over entry standards, resolving the conflict noted above.   
The contested ownership over the data entry standards related to Rebrand led to the 
establishment of supporting processes that had a direct bearing on the proposed 
implementation of the ‘clones filter’.  In particular, the process whereby ‘clones’ 
records based on the involvement of fee earners was established has directly provided 
information about the matter. 
Clone creation is managed by the Indexing and Inputting Team, which oversees the 
quality assurance process that is carried out in conjunction with Information Advisors.  
Furthermore, these several processes are tailored to conform to the requirements of 
several Practice and Office groups, resulting in a large body of defined rules and 
exceptions.  One Assistant notes the difficulties caused by this complexity: 
“…it's good to have this process in hand…but I felt sometimes…people got 
confused…By changing one part in [a record] then you reshuffle the whole thing, and 
that took a bit of time for people to master.  And by the time they become confident 
with that they will have to leave. Then we have to start the whole process again… 
there needs to be more training guidelines in place for [Rebrand] because people do 
get overwhelmed in the beginning when they sit [down with it].” 
5.2.5 Mediating Processes 
The varied interpretations of the proposed changes are integrated through the 
mediation of a number of processes. 
Epistemic Processes are related to the distribution of knowledge between participants 
in the organisation.  Understanding of the complex system is dispersed.  Furthermore, 
the understanding of the nature, aims, and limits of the system is not fixed, but subject 
to revision through knowledge sharing.  Epistemic processes are the means through 
which diverse participants mutually shape their understanding of the system. 
Economic Processes are related to the performance of rational calculations of costs 
and benefits.  These processes are informed by the epistemic processes, which 
determine how costs and benefits are defined and measured. 
Both of these processes are permeated by the exercise of Power, which privilege 
certain views over others in the epistemic processes, and determine which costs and 
benefits are considered for the calculations considered in the economic processes.   
 
Just as the interpretive contexts cannot be easily distinguished, the mediating 
processes are also intertwined.  For example, perceived mastery of a given 
interpretive context means that the perspectives of a group will tend to be empowered 
in epistemic processes. Similarly, control over funding and budget allocation has a 
direct influence on participation in the economic processes.  
 
5.3 Mediating Processes for changes to Rebrand 
5.3.1 Epistemic Processes: 
A number of formal and informal epistemic processes have been employed with 
varying levels of success over the course of the Rebrand project, though some 
informants cite an early failure to gather core requirements and re-validate existing 
documentation during the transition from the Operational System through ERP-
Outlier to Rebrand as one of the primary sources of continued problems with the 
system as a whole: 
“My sense at the time was always that…it was being delivered…without really ever 
having fully understood the requirements…we needed a Credential system - that was 
without a doubt - but nobody really had taken the time.  [We were] delivering a 
system that was meeting the ERP-Outlier needs without really knowing what that 
meant.” 
Following the implementation of Rebrand and the roll-out of the system, a number of 
cross-functional ad hoc groups were created that played some role in helping 
participants make sense of problems and proposed changes to the system; however, 
for some informants these groups sometimes failed to produce a truly open or shared 
vision. When asked about coordination between the different governing groups 
involved in Rebrand, and whether this was a net benefit, one informant replied 
“Not really, no.  Well, I just think there's been a lot of time-wasting over the whole 
[cloning issue], and you feel that decisions have been made and then you're working 
towards something, right?  And then, all of a sudden, something comes up…and 
everything has to be changed.  You know, we thought we kind of resolved that 
issue…It was all stop, start, stop, start.” 
An important epistemic process cited by informants is the creation of business cases, 
which have been compiled at many junctures of the various phases of the Rebrand 
project.   
5.3.2 Economic Processes: 
Discussions of the ways in which costs and benefits are calculated were covered in the 
interview data, but most comments along these lines were heavily coloured by 
references to politics and power.  One informant who is relatively remote from 
Rebrand but who holds decision-making power by virtue of participation in Project 
Boards summarised the economic criteria used in terms of cost, priority, and value 
relative to other competing projects: 
“…obviously there are other competing projects in the business, and...you need to 
understand what else is going on in order to be able to prioritise but...the only 
justification for investing significantly in Rebrand would be if we felt it was really 
going to generate some efficiencies that we're not currently getting from the system.” 
In fact, these three criteria played a significant role in development of the interpretive 
contexts described above, since these seemingly straightforward criteria conceal 
considerable complexity.  Determining the true cost of an involved system such as 
Rebrand is not a straightforward task, since many costs of maintaining the system in 
its current form are absorbed by diverse parts of the business. Furthermore, the 
opportunity costs of maintaining the system in its current form are difficult to 
calculate, as summed up by the comments of this ISS informant: 
"...they don't see the bottom line; there's no bottom line to them.  I know I have had 
two developers...working on Rebrand consistently for about four years...let's call it 
£500 a day...So 220 days a year...220 times £500 times 4 [per developer]...that's your 
ball park figure, and that's just developer time.  You’ve then got tester time, [business 
analyst] time, your time, your team's time, IT Support time...plus opportunity costs." 
This highlights the importance of communicating economic information to decision 
makers, to ensure that the full range of costs is considered. 
5.3.3 Operations of Power: 
Epistemic and economic processes are both constrained by the operations of power, 
which can obstruct knowledge and value-sharing (Dhillon, 2011). 
Power is often connected with control over funding. Sometimes this takes the form of 
control over economic discussions, as demonstrated by the control over the ISS 
department over estimating the cost off Rebrand III, which was passed on to the 
Project Board with no visibility or justification of the overall calculations for the other 
functions involved in the process.  Other times, power is spread across multiple 
groups.  This, too, can lead to problems, as cross-functional systems require support 
that requires approval from many groups based on recognition of mutual benefit.  The 
comments of one informant with considerable experience of such projects 
demonstrate this point: 
“That's where the politics comes in...This is always the problem...everyone agrees 
that it's a good idea to integrate data. But funding goes by these verticals, and data 
goes in horizontals, and nobody has budgets that go in horizontals.  So you're almost 
going cap in hand [to] all these different places... but no one in the line is going to 
volunteer their budget to help anyone else." 
The operations of power are not purely focused on funding, however, but can also 
play a role in determining who controls key epistemic processes.  The Engagement 
Consultants team was created as a way of mediating relationships between the ISS 
department and other functions, with each Consultant assigned responsibility for 
relationships with a certain group.  Since the Engagement Consultants become 
responsible for the production of business cases, this has been cited as creating an 
extra layer of separation between decision-makers in ISS and stakeholders in other 
functions: 
“And in fact, the business case, for this system and others, was primarily written by 
this ISS engagement consultant…  The actual establishment of, engagement 
consultants is a relatively new thing.  I think it's a bit problematic because within 
K&L we already had existing relationships with ISS.  So basically to in-house your 
relationships with external parties and to centralize them in one of your own 
resources then responsible for creating business cases, etc., strikes me as potentially 
having some conflict in the role.” 
 
5.4 Decision-Making 
The operations of power on the epistemic and economic processes produce a decision 
that is supported by the organisation, by filtering the integrated interpretations of the 
various participants and stakeholders in the project and producing a set cost-benefit 
calculations based on the overall organisation-level interpretation of the nature and 
value of proposed changes. The decision is ‘organisation-level’ in that it reconciles 
participants’ perspectives with the power structures, and is capable of motivating 
change at the organisational level. 
 
It was noted above that proposed changes to a given system can be met with one of 
four responses: a) maintenance of the as-is system, b) improvement of the system 
within existing constraints, c) improvement of the system by changing existing 
constraints, and d) decommissioning of the system.  The attraction of the first three of 
these options can be explained in relation to the interpretive contexts and mediating 
processes outlined above. 
Because the catalyst for change often has its roots in misalignment of the system with 
the internal or external environment that leads to organisational tension, means that 
maintenance of the as-is system, will rarely be effective or desirable for decision-
makers, despite the fact that it entails no explicit cost, since it also does nothing to 
address the catalyst for change.  The ability to flat out reject valid proposals for 
change is only tenable where power is concentrated. 
By contrast, improvement of the existing system within existing constraints is more 
attractive.  Because change is incremental, explicit costs are low, as is the need to 
engage in more fundamental processes that challenge current interpretations of the 
meaning and value of the organisation system.  At the same time, incremental change 
does have the effect of lessening the organisational tension embodied by the catalyst 
for change, though it may not eliminate the root causes of this tension. 
Improvement of the system by changing existing constraints is more costly than 
incremental change.  It often involves large explicit costs that must be managed in 
order to replace problematic technical components and supporting processes.  It also 
requires deep engagement in costly and time-consuming epistemic and economic 
processes as described above.  The potential benefits of successful initiatives of this 
type, however, are greater – not only in terms of fully addressing the catalyst for 
change, but also in realising new efficiencies.  Failure, on the other hand, can come at 
a great organisational and psychological cost – especially for the decision-makers who 
support such initiatives. 
5.4.1 Decisions in relation to Rebrand 
The most significant organisation-level decisions in the history of Rebrand have been 
the initial freezing of the ERP-Outlier project and denials of all requests for funding to 
address its core technical and design issues.  The firm has consistently chosen change 
within existing constraints, as described above. 
 
5.5 Changes to the System 
The set of changes embodied by the formal consensus that has emerged from the 
interpretive-influencing activities and the mediating processes can have varying 
degrees of fit with the actual requirements. Where the resulting changes to the 
technical platform of a system do not fully align with the critical needs of participants, 
those participants are forced to adapt the existing processes under their power in order 
to address the catalyst for change. 
5.5.1 Changes to the System in Rebrand 
The story of Rebrand development since the initial freeze of the ERP-Outlier project 
is a story of adapting non-technical processes to compensate for constraints imposed 
by the technical design and implementation of its legacy systems.  Because Rebrand 
was not integrated with the firm’s financial and enterprise systems at the outset, data 
entry and quality assurance teams were put in place to provide the benefits of 
integration.  Because the system design was based on the assumption that deal records 
should be associated with specific Practice groups within the firm, a manual process 
for duplicating records was deployed to ensure data coverage that would meet the 
requirements for adoption of the system by Marketing.   
These changes to manual processes can sometimes become catalysts for technical 
changes in their own right, as in the case of the clone filter, which was implemented 
because duplicate records interfered with usage of the system by fee earners. 
Changes of this sort run the risk that they become part of the new status quo.  This can 
be observed in the case of Rebrand development.  Though those informants closest to 
the project were unanimous in their belief that the system is in need of substantial 
change due to the inefficient supporting processes, the connection between the system 
design and these processes was invisible to some commentators more removed from 
the project: 
“I've got some visibility of other IT projects that are in the pipeline...and my sense is 
that Rebrand is a long way off being on the priority list and...that's probably right, 
because it does do a job.  I think if we were to make any investments, my gut feeling is 
it should be around the process rather than the system itself.  I think the system can 
generate useful information but it just goes back to junk in, junk out.” 
 
6.0 Comparison with existing models of change 
In keeping with the grounded methodology employed, the model advanced herein is 
rooted in discussions with informants during the course of data collection.  However, 
its value can be better assessed through a comparison with the existing academic 
literature (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The substantive theory of change that has emerged from 
this approach can be compared with existing models for managing organisational 
change. One of the earliest is Kurt Lewin’s three-phase model (Unfreeze – Change – 
Freeze). In the Information Systems context, this model is represented as a transition 
from an As-Is System to a To-Be System, with the Unfreeze phase associated with 
analysis and design, the Change phase with a migration plan that involves technical 
conversion and change management, and the Freeze phase with support and 
maintenance.  (Tegarden et al, 2012).  
However, despite its wide adoption within the Information Systems literature, a return 
to Lewin’s writings shows that his model is concerned with the social dynamics of 
group decisions; group standards are unfrozen and then performance is ‘refrozen’ at a 
higher level.  Lewin argues, with reference to his theory of social fields, for the 
superiority of group procedures over individual decisions (Lewin 1947).  In terms of 
scope, Lewin’s model is applicable at all levels of social life, and can be used to 
describe society-wide changes in discrimination against specific groups as well as it 
can to explain increased milk consumption among a small group of housewives.   
(Lewin 1947) 
A second model of change is that of punctuated equilibrium, advanced by Tushman, 
Newman, and Romanelli (1986. This model is characterised by two key phases 
convergence, and upheaval, which is described as “discontinuous or ‘frame-breaking’ 
change [that] involves simultaneous and sharp shifts in strategy, power, structure, and 
controls” (Tushman 1986).  Convergence activities are categorised as instances of 
either fine-tuning of exploitation of existing resources or of incremental adjustments 
to environmental shifts.  Upheaval, on the other hand, has its origins in major 
environmental changes, including industry discontinuities, product-life-cycle shifts, 
and internal company dynamics. The scope of this model is focused on the 
organisational level, and it is permeated by an emphasis on the role of executive 
leadership on the management of incremental and frame-breaking changes. 
 
Recently, Besson and Rowe (2012) have combined the main phases outlined by 
Lewin and Tushman et al and advanced a four-phase model of change characterised 
by Uprooting – Exploration / Construction – Stabilization / Institutionalization – and 
Optimization, and used this model as the basis for an investigation into the whole 
range of subsequent discussions of change in the IS literature (Besson and Rowe, 
2012). 
The model of change that has emerged from the present study differs from both the 
Unfreeze-Change-Freeze and Punctuated Equilibrium models – and, by extension, the 
model advanced by Besson and Rowe (2012) - in several respects.   
First, its object is rooted in the socio-technical, beginning as it does with a focus on 
the existing system, which can only be understood in its totality through attention to 
the full range of psychological, structural, process-oriented, and technical contexts 
that define it.  By contrast, despite the prevalence of the model within the Information 
Systems literature, the constraints imposed by the technological artefact upon the 
potential and nature of the change process are not touched upon in Lewin’s writings.  
While the technical artefact is invoked by the model of Punctuated Equilibrium, it 
appears as either a motivator for change (for example, substitute product or process 
technologies that play a role in creating industry discontinuities) or as an output of the 
frame-breaking change process.  Instead, the locus of change in this model is the 
organisation as a whole, with technology playing a secondary role. 
Second, the model presented here depicts the decision-making process as one 
emerging from the shared sense-making activities of diverse individuals, in relation to 
a catalyst for change that stems from misalignment of the system with the internal or 
external environment.  Lewin takes sense-making processes into account but, there is 
an implication that a key decision-maker is defining a desirable level of performance 
and then arranging things so that this new level is attained and preserved.  Punctuated 
equilibrium is more explicit in its focus on the role of central executive leadership, as 
frame-breaking change requires direct executive involvement in all aspects of the 
change.  However, the Punctuated Equilibrium model does not address the processes 
through which decision-makers come to recognise the need for change. 
Third, the model advanced here originated in an attempt to understand how the 
change process can lead to continued, sub-optimal outcomes for the system.  The 
Rebrand case study illustrates how development can pass through successive 
iterations and incremental improvements while preserving core design constraints that 
undermine the overall value of the whole system, due to the difficulties that arise in 
the course of defining and sharing the diverse perspectives of multiple participants as 
to what is required from the system, and the economic and political attractions of 
applying half-way measures.  Furthermore, failure to address fundamental problems 
in the system can lead to degradation, as complexity increases with excessive work-
arounds.  Lewin’s model does not capture this aspect of the change process, since its 
focus is on the attainment and preservation of higher levels of performance.  This no 
doubt implies that return to a lower level of performance is possible, but there is no 
indication that the Unfreeze – Change – Freeze process could result in a lower level of 
performance.  Punctuated Equilibrium, based on a two-phase model, seems at first 
less well-suited for describing the problems posed by an system that is - to appropriate 
Lewin’s phraseology, ‘semi-Frozen’, but on a closer reading it becomes clear that this 
is only because Tushman et al. are focussed on change to an organisation in the 
broadest sense.  In fact, the Punctuated Equilibrium model contains explicit 
recognition that sub-optimal changes can become constraints.  Though the scope of 
this change model differs from that advanced in the present research, Punctuated 
Equilibrium is similarly based on the insight that incremental change can become a 
constraining factor to successful future development.  
 
 
7.0 Conclusions 
This study has used a case study methodologically rooted in elements of grounded 
theory and action research, to advance a model of information systems change that 
can help explain how incremental change can lead to suboptimal outcomes.  The 
emerged model suggests that change can be understood as the outcome of a decision-
making process involving the operation of mediating processes on the shared 
interpretive contexts of multiple participants.  The model of decision-making 
demonstrated the attractiveness of incremental change to decision-makers with 
reference to concepts that emerged from interviews with informants, and observed 
that failure to make significant changes could result in corresponding alterations to 
processes elsewhere in the system.  
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